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Abstract. Since the end of the Bretton Woods system and the stagflation of the 1970s, the transatlantic core, 
under the leadership of the United States of America, has been trying to expand its model of free market capitalism 
embracing every part of the globe, while addressing its domestic overaccumulation crisis. This article follows a 
historical methodological perspective and draws from the concept of Uneven and Combined Development (UCD), 
which helps us consider the structural reasons behind the long and protracted decline of the American economic 
power. In this respect, according to the UCD concept, there is no global power that can enjoy the privilege for being 
at the top of the global capitalist system forever in a world which develops unevenly and in a combined way. Power 
shifts across the world and new powers come to challenge the current hegemonic power and its alliance systems. 
The novelty of the article is that it locates this decline in the 1970s and considers it as being consubstantial with the 
state economic policy of neo-liberalism and financialisation (supply-side economics). However the financialised 
capitalism of the transatlantic assemblage lack industrial base producing, reproducing and recycling real commodity 
values. Further, the article shows that this attempt to remain at the top of the global capitalist system forever has not 
been successful, not least because the regime which the recovery of the core had rested upon, that of neo-liberal 
financialisation represents a major vulnerability of the transatlantic assemblage eroding the primacy of the United 
States of America in it.  
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Аннотация. С момента краха Бреттон-Вудской системы и стагфляции 1970-х гг. трансатлантическое 
ядро под руководством Соединенных Штатов Америки пыталось расширить свою модель капитализма 
свободного рынка, охватив все части земного шара, и в то же время урегулировать внутренний кризис 
чрезмерного накопления. Автор следует исторической методологической перспективе и опирается на 
концепцию неравномерного и комбинированного развития (НКР), которая помогает рассмотреть 
структурные причины длительного и продолжительного упадка американской экономической мощи. Вместе 
с тем, согласно концепции НКР, в мире, развивающемся неравномерно и комбинированно, не существует 
мировой державы, которая единолично занимает лидирующие позиции в глобальной капиталистической 
системе. Смена власти по всему миру и новые страны бросают вызов современному гегемонистскому 
государству и системе его союзников. Новизна исследования заключается в том, что она относит спад 
                                                            
© Fouskas V.K., 2021 
 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ 
 
Фускас В.К. Вестник РУДН. Серия: Международные отношения. 2021. Т. 21. № 2. С. 243—251 
244 ТЕМАТИЧЕСКОЕ ДОСЬЕ: Нарастающее стратегическое соперничество между США и КНР… 
американской экономической мощи к 1970-м гг. и рассматривает его в контексте государственной 
экономической политики неолиберализма и финансиализации (экономика предложения). При этом 
основной проблемой финансового капитализма трансатлантического объединения является отсутствие 
промышленной базы для производства, воспроизводства и переработки сырьевых товаров. Отмечается, что 
попытка этих стран навсегда остаться на вершине глобальной капиталистической системы не увенчалась 
успехом, в особенности из-за режима, на котором базировалось восстановление ядра — неолиберальной 
финансиализации. Сделан вывод, что неолиберальная финансиализация угрожает трансатлантическому 
объединению, подрывая в нем первенство Соединенных Штатов Америки. 
Ключевые слова: неолиберальная финансиализация, управление государством посредством финансов, 
Китай, США, Великая рецессия, стагфляция 
 
Для цитирования: Fouskas V.K. Prelude to America’s Downfall: The Stagflation of the 1970s // Вестник  
Российского университета дружбы народов. Серия: Международные отношения. 2021. Т. 21. № 2.  
С. 243—251. DOI: 10.22363/2313-0660-2021-21-2-243-251 
 
Introduction	
This short article defines “globalisation” as 
“financialisation”. Primarily, this is because 
finance was the first sector in the post-Bretton 
Woods era of floating exchange rates that was 
truly globalised. “Closing the gold window”, as 
was characteristically put [Gowa 1983], was a 
conscientious decision taken by US state elites to 
solve a lingering balance of payment crisis that 
appeared in the early 1960s. Secondarily, this is 
because finance and fictitious commodity 
markets have dominated the political economies 
of the transatlantic assemblage since the 1980s, 
when supply-side neoliberal policy-making 
became embedded displacing Keynesian aggregate 
demand management along with the manufacturing 
sector and Fordist wages [Glyn 2007; Gowan 
1999]. Thus, financialisation is neo-liberal and 
was initiated and led by the US state. As a 
Council on Foreign Relations publication suggests, 
financial statecraft is “the active participation of 
the US state’s monetary institutions in facilitating 
new forms of global capital flows” that, by and 
large, were dormant since the 1930s (securities, 
asset management, derivatives and futures, credit 
default swaps and collateralized debt obligations, 
portfolio investment, special vehicles, etc.) 
[Steil, Litan 2008].  
My narrative follows a historical 
methodological perspective and draws from the 
concept of uneven and combined development 
(see below). This approach has assisted the 
research design in that it made clear the 
structural asymmetries of global accumulation 
processes and their contradictions. The various 
data from the sources reviewed here are cross-
checked against contemporary macroeconomic 
data. The argument put forth is that neo-liberal 
financialisation constitutes a major vulnerability 
of the US system of global power, undermining 
its primacy and giving way to its sheer 
competitors, first and foremost China, but also 
Russia and India. Although there is no space here 
to examine in detail the grounding of China in 
the global political economy or how the 
EU/Eurozone can offer a response to its own 
existential crisis especially in the midst of the 
COVID-19 pandemic, the driving structural force 
of uneven and combined development (UCD) in 
bringing about such drastic change in the global 
distribution of power should be factored in. 
UCD, a notion first developed by Russian 
Marxist revolutionary Leon Trotsky, is defined 
as a “loosely articulated web of events, actors 
and processes developing at different speeds, 
whose individual courses were interconnected in 
labyrinthine ways” [Tooze 2015: 29; Rosenberg 
2010].  
To sum up, this essay maintains that US 
primacy has been eroded, first, by an internal 
competitive constraint combining the 
antagonistic economic correlation between 
Japan, West Germany and the USA during the 
“Golden Age of Capitalism” [Marglin, Schor 
1992; Hobsbawm 1995]; and then by China’s 
economic rise since the 1990s, adding on another 
competitive constraint. The structural driving 
force of these developments has been UCD 
empowered and guided by the state, whether 
Chinese, Japanese, German or American.   
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Two	Phases	of	Financialisation	/	
Globalisation	
Neo-liberal financial statecraft marks a 
historical phase of capitalist modernity that 
pertains to a double transformation: first, it aims 
at transforming the internal environment of the 
state via the public policy of neoliberalism, for 
Anglo-Saxon states, and ordoliberalism for 
European Economic Community / European 
Community / European Union / Eurozone states; 
second, it transforms the external environment of 
it via the liberalisation of the exchange rate 
mechanism, the opening-up of money/financial 
markets and the transnationalization/globalisation 
of the corporation. Both transformations are 
feeding each other1.  
In this new dialectic of national / 
international, the transformation of the global 
multinational corporation (American, Japanese, 
and European) is very important. A key feature 
of the new global corporation is that it takes 
advantage of technological innovation, relinquishes 
the Fordist model of mass production for mass 
consumption and, in its search to discover cheap 
labour markets and favourable taxation regimes, 
creates polygonal supply chains and networks of 
production, assemblage, circulation and 
consumption across the entire globe [Dicken 
2007; Fouskas, Gökay 2012]. 
Joint transnational ventures and mergers and 
acquisitions become the new norm. The aim is 
the augmentation of profitability by way of 
making up the losses incurred under the previous 
Keynesian / Fordist regime of fixed exchange 
rates and solid industrial economic growth — 
what came conventionally to be called as the 
“Golden Age of Capitalism”. Returns and assets, 
                                                            
1 Both “neo-liberalism” and “ordoliberalism” are 
supply-side public policies. Nevertheless, the former 
applies more pertinently to Anglo-American contexts, 
whereas the latter to the German-Austrian ones. As we 
have shown elsewhere, Germany managed to transplant its 
ordoliberal model of capital accumulation onto the EU / 
Euro-zone [Fouskas, Gökay 2019]. The ordoliberal model 
is more disciplinarian than the neo-liberal one, insists on a 
strict de-politicisation of social economy and on a strict 
separation of the central banking mechanism from political 
and trade union influences. I touch upon ordoliberalism 
below. 
however, tend to be increasingly financialised — 
and often dollarized — as the dollar was freed of 
its gold fetter and investors realised that 
speculation on paper assets denominated in 
dollars is more profitable than employing 
unionised workers handing out full-time 
contracts and high (Fordist) wages [Foster, 
Magdoff 2009]. 
It should be noted, that neo-liberal financial 
statecraft was and remains a project structured, 
primarily, along the reproductive expansionary 
needs of the American empire-state and comes as 
a response to the overaccumulation crisis of the 
1970s2. This crisis, unlike the Great Recession  
of 2008, manifested itself in the real  
economic sector, especially in industry. The 
overaccumulation crisis of the 1970s was caused 
by multiple factors — strong social and trade 
union movements, the erosion of America’s gold 
reserves, the Vietnam war, etc. — and was 
captured, to a great degree, by debates and 
arguments developed, among others, by 
researchers and politicians Alexander Callinicos, 
Leo Panitch, Giovanni Arrighi, Justin Rosenberg 
and Robert Brenner [Rosenberg 2001; Arrighi 
2007; Brenner 2006; Panitch, Gindin 2013; 
Callinicos 2009]. 
Nevertheless, what seems to me as the most 
prominent factor is the structural force of UCD 
in the core capitalisms of Europe, Japan and the 
USA. This form of competitive constraint in the 
1970s drove down the (average) rate of profit 
over a period of years, forcing industrialists to 
inflate the economy, seek state support and, 
eventually, to financialise as the decline in 
profitability was sustained and persistent 
[Armstrong, Glyn, Harrison 1984: 257]. 
Importantly, at the time, the markets of the 
global South were relatively closed due to anti-
colonial struggles, import substituting policies 
(Brazil, Argentina) and the rise of Baathist 
socialism in the Middle East (Egypt, Syria, Iraq). 
Similarly, the Soviet bloc and China could not 
offer free markets to the West to support its 
recovery from its overaccumulation crisis 
[Sanchez-Sibony 2014]. 
                                                            
2 The stagflation is economic stagnation accompanied 
by high inflation. 
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From the early 1960s onwards the USA 
began registering a balance of payments deficit, 
not least because other members of the core, 
such as France, began exchanging their surplus 
dollars with US gold reserves, as gold remained 
a tradable commodity. This, brought the Bretton 
Woods system to its knees, forcing the Nixon 
administration to get rid of the gold fetter and 
devalue the US dollar, placing essentially the 
entire global political economy on a pure dollar 
standard, especially after the US-Saudi 
agreement of 1973—1974, which stipulated that 
oil should be traded in dollars only [Fouskas, 
Gökay 2005].  
Thus, neo-liberal financial statecraft is 
essentially a project driven by the American state 
in its hub-and-spoke hierarchical articulation 
with other subordinate political economies of the 
global core and the global periphery. The interest 
rate hike engineered by the former head of the 
American Federal Reserve System (Fed), Paul 
Volcker, causing havoc in the debt markets of 
Latin America and (communist) Eastern Europe, 
should be seen as representing the culmination of 
the first period of the statecraft (1971—1990). 
Moreover, the relentless drive to open up East 
European markets to American and European 
capital, a process explained by British professor 
Peter Gowan, stems precisely from the need of 
the saturated capitals of the core to expand 
globally, overcoming their overaccumulation 
crisis at home [Gowan 1999].  
Having said this, the big “success” for the 
USA came during the second period of financial 
statecraft (1990—2007), which ended up in the 
Great Recession of 2007—2008. This period 
embraced mortgage markets (housing) and 
massive involvement of the shadow banking 
sector. Further, the project, having as key 
operational offshore hubs the Wall Street and the 
City of London, was assisted by the opening-up 
of East European markets in the wake of the 
collapse of “really-existing socialism”. As the 
“Volcker shock” came to a halt signalling the 
end of the first period of the statecraft  
(1971—1990), the American Fed ushered in an 
era of low interest rates, which drove up the price 
of stocks and bonds. These were “owned 
exclusively”, as professor of history Robert 
Brenner put it, “by the very rich”3.  
The creation of this new cross-border 
financial oligarchy in the transatlantic area 
headed by US financial capital and extended 
with myriad of tentacles via the global 
proliferation of banking, accounting, insurance 
and other financial services, severely side-lined 
the power of industrial capital and the real 
economic sector of the core. With the partial 
exceptions of Germany and Japan, the 
manufacturing base of the core since the 1980s 
has been shrinking. Today’s manufacturing base 
of Britain and the USA stand at 8.8 % and 
11.1 % of their respective GDP (but it is 21 %  
in Germany and 20.8 % in Japan) [Fouskas, 
Gökay 2019].  
No accident, the Western economies as a 
whole have since the 1970s entered a period of 
“long downturn”, that is a period of slow and 
protracted decline of their real economic sector, 
which could not be matched by periods of 
financial euphoria, such as that of 1991—2007 — 
the second period of financial statecraft that 
corresponds to low interest rates. When credit 
was cheap, hence accessible, demand was 
financed by increased borrowing, creating 
unsustainable levels of consumer (and other) 
debt [Alele 2020].  
Further, the financial oligarchy packaged, 
rated, priced and sold this and other forms of 
debt and paper assets across the globe — such as 
that resulting from retained profits — in a 
delirium of grotesque profiteering and speculation 
creating an unsustainable financialisation chain. 
Most part of this fictitious capital had not 
trickled down to the real economic sector as 
investments in production and infrastructure, 
especially since the global (western) corporation 
was migrating to the “global East and South” 
(China, India, Brazil, South Africa, and Turkey).  
 
How	Financialisation	Erodes	US	Primacy	
There are arguments that downplay 
financialisation as a fundamental component of 
                                                            
3 Brenner R. Editorial: Introducing Catalyst // Catalyst. 
2017. Vol. 1. No. 1 (Spring). URL: https://catalyst-
journal.com/vol1/no1/editorial-robert-brenner (accessed: 
01.01.2021). 
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neo-liberal policy-making, assessing all the 
above as a virtuous cycle of capitalist growth, 
centred around the robustness of US capitalism 
and the capacity of the American empire-state to 
integrate under its aegis other socio-economic 
formations, in fact, the entire globe. In this view, 
the American state is “the author of neo-liberal 
globalisation”, integrating China in its very 
system, the making of global capitalism having 
the colours of the American empire-state [Albo, 
Gindin, Panitch 2010; Panitch, Gindin 2013]. 
Effectively, financialisation is dealt with as part 
and parcel of the total circuit of productive 
capital and not as speculative process relatively 
dissociated from real commodity production. 
“This is a false dichotomy”, Canadian researches 
Leo Panitch, Greg Albo and Sam Gindin warn. 
“Money capital, bank capital, credit and 
speculative capital are all necessary moments in 
the circuits of capitalist production and 
exchange” [Albo, Gindin, Panitch 2010: 33].  
We counter that the two phases of the  
U.S.-led financial statecraft did not remotely 
match the levels of economic development of the 
Golden Age of Capitalism. American sociologist 
Richard Lachmann has recently put it as follows: 
US growth was much faster and shared far more 
equitably before 1974 than after. Similarly, 
Western European GDP enjoyed annual average 
compound growth rates of 4.08 per cent for 
1950–1973 but only 1.78 per cent for 1973–
1998. The comparable figures for Japan are 8.05 
per cent and 1.33 per cent. Bretton Woods was 
successful at limiting if not blocking capital 
flows and modulating changes in exchange rates, 
preventing the banking crises that emerged after 
1970 with unrestrained speculation in currencies 
and the enormous growth in “hot money”. 
Worldwide, there were at least 124 financial 
crises from 1970 to 2007 [Lachmann 2020: 359]. 
Debt is a form of capital, but it is fictitious 
capital. Thus, although it is not a 
“superstructure” of the real process of capital 
accumulation and development it should not be 
confused with them. As German philosopher 
Karl Marx put it, “in the way that even an 
accumulation of debts can appear an accumulation 
of capital, we see the distortion involved in the 
credit system reach its culmination” [Marx 
1894/1991: 607—608]. Thus, I argue that neo-
liberal financial statecraft and the unsustainable 
levels of debt incurred in its second phase of 
evolution (1991 onwards) represent a major 
vulnerability of American capitalism and of the 
transatlantic core it leads geopolitically. As many 
Marxist and non-Marxist commentators have 
remarked from very early days, this vulnerability, 
has been long and protracted, dating back to the 
1960s [Mandel 1969, 1972, 1975; Gilpin 2001; 
Frank 1998]. Furthermore, because of the 
inappropriate measures taken by the polities of the 
core to address the underlying causes of the Great 
Recession of 2007—2008, the debt situation got 
worse. 
The augmentation of debt, both public and 
private, as a percentage of GDP increased 
exponentially since the 1990s. Further, a key 
feature of the “stabilisation” packages in the 
wake of the collapse of the Lehman Brothers in 
September 2008 was their half-baked 
Keynesianism (some call it “new consensus 
macroeconomics), i.e. monetary bail-outs for 
large global and national corporations in the 
financial and banking sectors, while dropping the 
interest rates to near-zero and allowing a timid 
industrial policy, often via trade protectionism4.  
Thus, enterprises continued their profiteering 
and speculative activities by financialising their 
profits, instead of investing them into material 
production, the result being further drops in 
industrial output and a pilling up of debt, 
including consumer debt. Since 2008, the debt 
increased exponentially in every single economic 
sector (government, household, non-financial 
corporate, financial corporate). In 2019, global 
debt was over 260 trillion USD, or 325 % of 
global GDP. By comparison, in 2012 the figure 
was 207 trillion USD, or 300 % of global GDP5. 
                                                            
4 Mavroudeas S. Economic crisis and the crisis of 




mavroudeas (accessed: 17.05.2020). See also: [Arestis 
2009]. 
5 Tiftik E., Mahmood K. High and rising debt levels: 
should we worry? // Institute of International Finance. 
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If we look at government debt, then matters 
are more revealing. The USA tops the list 
holding the world’s 31 % of government debt, or 
104.3 % of its GDP, i.e. 21,465 bln USD. It is 
followed by Japan (17 %) and China (9.8 %),  
but these two countries’ government debt, 
especially China’s, is largely due to financing of 
its state-owned enterprises (see below) [Fouskas,  
Roy-Mukherjee, Huang, Udeogu 2021].  
COVID-19 increased debt at astonishing levels 
in 2020: the IMF has estimated that across the 
“advanced” countries, gross government debt 
will rise to 66 trillion USD, or 122 % of GDP, an 
increase of 17 %, and with the USA running a 
deficit of 15 %6. Overall, contrary to what had 
been the case in the 1970s and 1980s when the 
debt was primarily an affair of the “global 
South”, the world’s debt today is mostly held by 
the “advanced” economies (75.4 %)7.  
If lower — and, indeed, near-zero since 
2009 — interest rates do not bring about lower 
debt levels relative to GDP, it means that 
investors benefitting from this favourable 
economic climate direct their profits to 
speculative profiteering rather than material 
production and job creation. Effectively, it means 
that the low levels of industrial production, the 
high concentration of economic activity in 
services and consumption, hence the disabling of 
the production of real use and exchange values 
are responsible for the large government debt in 
the “advanced” economies. Growth becomes 
driven by bubbles generated in banking and 
financial services. Characteristically, the city-
state of Singapore, an off-shore financial services 
economy par excellence and the largest logistics 
centre in the world has accumulated large 
amounts of government debt8.  
Furthermore, “gig” and precarious work 
have since the 1980s proliferated [Chen 2020: 
122–142]. The breakdown of the Fordist / 
                                                                                                  
August 2019. URL: https://www.iif.com/Portals/0/Files/ 
content/GDM_July2019_vf3.pdf (accessed: 21.02.2020). 
6 After the disease, the debt // The Economist.  
April 25 — May 1, 2020. P. 15. 
7 General government gross debt, per cent of GDP // 
IMF. 2019. URL: https://www.imf.org/external/ 
datamapper/GGXWDG_NGDP@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/
WEOWORLD (accessed: 23.04.2020). 
8 Ibid. 
Keynesian consensus brought about not just a 
proliferation of part-time and flexible work, but 
also, especially after the Great Recession, a 
deepening of the process of exploitation and 
formal / informal subsumption of labour to 
capital via “gig” work and zero-time contracts. In 
Anglo-American neo-liberal contexts, the 
welfare state was further retrenched and large 
services of it, especially in the UK, were 
privatised. In ordoliberal Eurozone, the situation 
took on an unprecedented turn. 
 
The	Ordoliberal	EU	
Ordoliberalism is a form of supply-side 
economics that pertains to the German-Austrian 
model of capitalism. It is far more  
disciplinarian and rule-based and defines a rigid  
de-politicisation of the economic on the basis of 
a strict independence of the central banking 
mechanism. Literature on ordoliberalism assets 
that Germany has over the decades managed to 
transpose this model over the EU / Eurozone via 
a set of Treaties since the Single European Act of 
1986 [Dyson, Featherstone 1999; Bonefeld 2017; 
Fouskas, Roy-Mukherjee 2019; Fouskas, Gökay, 
2019].  
The global financial crisis of 2007—2008 
contaminated the ordoliberal EU via the banking 
sector, as many French and German banks were 
exposed to Anglo-American financial products 
[Lapavitsas, Kaltenbrunner, Lindo, Michell, 
Painceira et al. 2010; Fouskas, Dimoulas 2012]. 
The introduction of the European Monetary 
Union (EMU) in 1999 (2001 for Greece) turned 
the banks and the financial system of the region 
into a hotbed of speculation. The EMU widened 
the pre-existing gap between European core 
(surplus countries) and periphery (deficit 
countries) but, before the crisis, the economies of 
the periphery operated as platforms of inflows 
and outflows of cheap money. When the Great 
Recession brought about a sudden stop across the 
transatlantic banking sector, the banks, in order 
to avoid bankruptcy and de-leverage, turned to 
governments asking them to socialise their 
liabilities. The German and French governments 
obeyed and began forging repayments on 
periphery via humiliating bailout agreements.  
The absurdity of these agreements is mainly 
twofold: first, they displaced the crisis from the 
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core to the periphery (Ireland, Greece, Spain and 
Portugal); second, they transferred the liabilities 
from private to public institutions “socialising” 
them and making them “sovereign” — hence  
the adage “sovereign debt crisis”. Thus, the 
periphery ended up paying for the banking crisis 
of the core through harsh austerity packages. But 
this did not happen only in order to buttress the 
political elites and institutions of the EU and the 
core states and save the banking system and the 
Eurozone from total collapse. This is only the 
internal competitive constraint. Because the EU 
is both a single market and a customs union 
whereas most of its members operate via a 
common currency, it competes in global markets 
with the USA, Japan and China.  
Thus, the ordoliberal Treaties of the EU had 
had to be reformed and inject even more 
austerity and discipline in the co-federated 
members-states and that is how harsh austerity 
has become a permanent trait of the EU / 
Eurozone. It is, therefore, also the external 
combined competitive constraint articulated 
between the EU, China, Japan and the USA that 
necessitated the introduction of such 
unprecedented neo-colonial treaties as the Fiscal 
Compact and the European Semester programme 
on the part of the European Commission.  
Thus, in order to keep a competitive edge in 
the global division of labour, the central 
institutions of the EU are forced to defend the 
centrality of Germany in the Eurozone, hence its 
ordoliberal / neo-mercantilist growth model of 
“low wages, low inflation, export-led”. These are 
the roots of what the British academician  
Bob Jessop calls enduring austerity post-2008, a 
concept that tangles-up well with precarious and 
“gig” labour markets and a lackluster process of 
capital accumulation across the economies of the 
core as their nonchalant levels of GDP growth 
indicate [Fouskas, Roy-Mukherjee 2019]. 
Contrary to China’s pro-Keynesian turn after the 
Great Recession, between 2010 and 2019 the 
Eurozone and the USA “cut their public 
spending-to-GDP ratios by about 3.5 %… 
Britain’s fell by 6 %. Taxation, meanwhile, rose 
by between 1 % and 2 % of GDP”9. 
                                                            
9 Tomlinson D., Corbett A. The nature of self-
employment in 21st century Britain and policy 
To all intents and purposes, the so-called the 
“new consensus macroeconomics” did not work. 
State sponsored capital injections in the wake of 
the 2008 crisis and other stimuli — such as 
historically low interest rates — failed to deliver 
job creation, general welfare and sustainable 
development — they only soared up fiscal 
deficits. As if the Great Recession never 
happened, the neo-liberal governorates of the 
Left and the Right across the Euro-Atlantic  
area continued implementing supply-side 
policies coupled with massive dosages of 
authoritarianism in order to sustain harsh 
austerity measures, hoping to address challenges 
stemming from the global competitive constraint 
of UCD [Fouskas, Gökay 2019]. It is under these 
conditions that flare-up all sort of morbid 
phenomena around the globe, especially in 
sensitive geopolitical areas, such as the Balkans, 
the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East.  
 
Final	Touches	
When the transatlantic political economies 
transitioned to neo-liberal financialisation under 
the aegis of the US state, the expectation was that 
US economic centrality would be restored via 
“disintegration”, as the American economist Paul 
Volcker called it, of the international political 
economy system10. Effectively, this meant the 
dismantling of the Keynesian interventionist 
state, retrenching social welfare and surrendering 
labour-power to supply-side economics. Inflation 
had to be defeated at all costs. It was proved to 
be a very precarious undertaking. The “back of 
inflation” was broken but at the expense of 
massive financial volatility and uncertainty, 
leading to unsustainable (government) debt 
levels and periodic crises, the apex of which was 
the Great Recession of 2008.  
                                                                                                  
implications // Resolution Foundation. February 2017. 
URL: https://www.resolutionfoundation.org/app/uploads/ 
2017/02/Self-employment-presentation.pdf (accessed: 
09.04.2020); After the disease, the debt // The Economist. 
April 25 — May 1, 2020. P. 15. 
10 Volcker P. The Political Economy of the Dollar — 
The Fred Hirsch Lecture, Warwick University // Federal 
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The problematic underlying condition of the 
financialised capitalism of the transatlantic 
assemblage is the lack of industrial base 
producing, reproducing and recycling real 
commodity values. Herein lies the failure of 
financialisation to generate satisfactory rates of 
socio-economic development, undermining 
productivity. After the Great Recession of 
2007—2008, labour productivity in China rose 
by 7—8 % per year, whereas in the USA was a 
bare 1 %. In the EU productivity growth was 
worse than the USA, especially in the Eurozone, 
which “hovered below 1 %”11.  
Germany is the only country in the 
transatlantic area that maintains a solid industrial 
and export-led base, a fact that enables her to 
lead the Eurozone on the basis of its ordoliberal 
austerity and deeply disciplinarian model of 
                                                            
11 Lapavitsas C. The crisis has exposed the absurdities 
of neoliberalism; that doesn’t mean it will destroy it // The 
Jacobin. March 27, 2020. URL: https://jacobinmag.com/ 
2020/03/coronavirus-pandemic-great-recession-
neoliberalism (accessed: 23.04.2020). 
capitalism. Same as neo-liberal austerity bred 
Brexit and the Trump phenomenon in the UK and 
the USA respectively, ordoliberal austerity, breeds 
xenophobic and racist movements across Europe. 
As we have seen, this is not because 
Germany wants to maintain a leading position as 
creditor in the 27-member bloc (the internal 
competitive constraint); this is also because of 
the (external) competitive constraint of China 
and other Asian producers, which disrupts 
Germany’s primacy in the EU / Eurozone. Thus, 
it is the structural power of UCD that has been 
driving the decline of the US economy in a neo-
liberal financialised context generated by the US 
state in the 1970s and 1980s in order to tackle the 
stagflation of the 1970s. The stagflation is the 
real prelude to America’s long and protracted 
economic decline. We have to come to terms 
with this decline in a careful and measured 
manner, so a major global war sanctioning the 
hegemonic transition from the Euro-Atlantic 
world to Asian powers is avoided.  
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